


8 May 1965




Dear Mr. President:

I have shown this letter to both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. If you wish I will hold further discussions with them to evolve a paper which will set forth the several views on the enclosed recommendations.

Basically, I agree with Mr. McCone's argument that the courses of action recommended in the Secretary of Defense's memorandum of 21 April are not likely, by themselves, to gain us our present objectives. As I understand it, Mr. McCone felt that the deployment of additional US troops to South Vietnam should be accompanied by heavier attacks on the more important targets located in northern North Vietnam, though this expansion need not be sudden and dramatic but could be gradual and extend over a period of time.

a. Our limited bombing of the North and our present ground force build-up in the South are not likely to exert sufficient pressure on the enemy to cause him to meet our present terms in the foreseeable future. I note very recent evidence which suggests that our military pressures are becoming somewhat more damaging to the enemy within South Vietnam, but I am inclined to doubt that this damage is increasing at a rate which will bring him quickly to the conference table.

b. I concur in the CIA-DIA-State view of 21 April that the large-scale introduction of US ground forces will not initially cause the enemy to back off.



c. I also concur in the recent intelligence warnings that the VC may seek some dramatic local victories in South Vietnam (e. g., investment of Da Nang and/or Kontum) in the near future -- that is, before the US can accomplish a large ground force build-up.

d. The envisaged US ground force holding operation will buy time for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), but it will also give the enemy time to improve his capabilities -- including the infiltration of more units of the "People's Army of North Vietnam" (PAVN). It is of course possible that the greater US/Government of South Vietnam (GVN) military effort on the ground will in time prove overwhelmingly discouraging to the enemy. Given our present course, this question -- the anti-guerrilla effectiveness of a greatly expanded US/GVN effort in South Vietnam -- will almost certainly prove the key determinant of whether, over a period of some time, we can impel the enemy to meet our terms. The French experience may unduly influence my judgment, but I am impressed with the consideration that if our air attacks against the North are confined within the limits recommended in the Secretary of Defense's memorandum, we will in effect be pressing the conflict on the ground where our capabilities enjoy the least comparative advantage. In these circumstances -- and given the enemy's known resolve and skill concerning attrition tactics over the long term -- I am concerned that we will find ourselves pinned down, with little choice left among possible subsequent courses of action: i. e., disengagement at very high cost, or broadening the conflict in quantum jumps.

e. In the event that, instead, the US/GVN effort should begin to wear down the Viet Cong (VC), I share the 21 April memorandum's judgment that the chances would be somewhat better than even that the "Democratic Republic of North Vietnam" (DRV) would seek at least a temporary political solution, rather than launch a major ground invasion.

I feel that Mr. McCone's recommended course of greater air action against the DRV is based on the following considerations:

a. The DRV is, in my view, unlikely to engage in meaningful discussions at any time in coming months until US air attacks have begun to damage or destroy its principal economic and military targets. I also concur with the USIB's judgment of 18 February 1965 (the State Department member dissenting) that, given such US punishment, the enemy would be "somewhat more likely" to decide to make some effort to secure a respite, rather than to intensify the struggle further and accept the consequent risks.

b. Insofar as possible, we should try to manage any program of expanded bombings in ways which (1) would leave the DRV an opportunity to explore negotiations without complete loss of face, (2) would not preclude any Soviet pressures on Hanoi to keep the war from expanding, and (3) would not suddenly produce extreme world pressures against us. In this connection, the timing and circumstances in which the bombings were extended northward could be of critical importance, particularly in light of the fact that there have been some indications of differing views between Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi. For example, it would probably be advantageous to expand bombings after, not before, some major new VC move (e.g., obvious concentration for imminent attack on Da Nang or Kontum) and after, not before, any current possibilities of serious negotiations have been fully tested. And such bombings should not be so regular as to leave no interval for the Communists to make concessions with some grace. Indeed, we should keep in mind the possibility of a pause at some appropriate time, which could serve to test the Communist intentions and to exploit any differences on their side.

We must not of course get overly preoccupied with military action and lose sight of the basically political aspect of the war. In the final analysis, it can only be won at the SVN hamlet level.

This will thus entail certain measures over and above greater military commitment and expanded punishment of the DRV. The most imperative of these are:

- a. Creating effective administrative, police, and local defense instrumentalities at the hamlet level.**
- b. Making US and GVN military measures support a growth of indigenous civilian political authority and serve legitimate local and national aspirations.**
- c. Expanding such political, economic, and sociological efforts as will close the gap between Saigon governments and the South Vietnamese population.**

The expanded air attacks on North Vietnam, judiciously exercised, are not expected to result in large-scale Chinese Communist intervention by ground forces in Vietnam or elsewhere in Southeast Asia, as long as the Chinese do not believe their vital security interest is threatened by US actions. In other words, the chances of such actions are less than even, but should not be wholly excluded.

/s/

**William F. Raborn, Jr.
Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.)
Director**

Attachments:

- Annex A - Mr. McCone's ltr of 28 Apr 65 - 188645**
Annex B - Expansion of views contained - 188645
in DCI's letter, 8 May 65
Annex C - Recent Intell Resume pertinent to - 18864
Vietnam Situation

STAT

WFR:mcm

- Cy #1 - The President w/atts
Cy #2 - McGeorge Bundy w/atts
Cy #3 - DCI White House File w/atts
Cy #4 - DCI Chrono w/o atts
Cy #5 - ER w/o atts - *via G. J. Allen*

Handcarried by DCI - 5/8/65

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